RoR: Forum

I am not sure when Rand offered up her definition of man as "a being of volitional consciousness," but it is certainly implicit in everything she has been writing since AS in which she tells us, via Galt, that instead of "I think, therefore I am," "I am, therefore I will think" should be accepted as a sound philosophical motto. This, as well as her ethical stance that states that we ought to attend to the world with our minds, which is a matter of choice, pretty much puts her on the free will side of the debate. ("Ought" implies "can".) Free will is required also in her epistemology, since the formation of concepts is never automatic but something everyone must initiate. I suppose we can engage in a quarrel about what is primary, what is not in Objectivism, but in such an ethically pregnant philosophy as Rand's, free will cannot be dropped--too much else depends on this human capacity. (Nor is it kosher to put in an aside about how volition is something mystical, without argument. Given its ontological base in the fact of multiple types of causes in nature, a la Aristotle and Joseph, Rand sure as heck didn't construe volition mystical!)
It might be nice to see some solid arguments in this kind of post, especially in light of the fact that the author knows full well of my own two books, The Pseudo-Science of B. F. Skinner (1974) and Initiative--Human Agency and Society (2000), the first of which in fact draws on his own theory of mind presented in the first issue of Reason Papers in 1974, under the title "The Double Aspect Theory of Mind" or something along these lines (I am away from home and cannot lay my hand on a copy of this issue of RP). In both of these books I address the effort to combine any bona fide ethics with any determinism of the sort that renders "could have done otherwise, all things being equal other than the agent's act of initiative," impossible. A great contemporary work to explore on this issue is Ed Pols's Acts of Our Being (U. of Mass Press, 1983). Finally, the issue really isn't whether one is or is not a bona fide Objectivists but whether the Objectivist, Randian idea that human beings are beings of volitional consciousness is true.

Post 1

Friday, July 15, 2005 - 3:14am

Good stuff.

I sanctioned the article (again). I think that compatibilism, with all its "problems", is the only way to go.

I think it's a waste of time to argue the issue at length if a person is already acquainted with most of the literature. In my opinion, the best book on free will is Elbow Room, by Daniel Dennett.

I read Dr. Machan's Initiative, and I wasn't impressed. The book seemed more to me like a rationalization of a preconceived notions than an inquiry into the thornier issues surrounding the debate. In Machan's book, there is no discussion of the limitations of introspection, or the problems scientists and philosophers have had defining the "self", the latter being a huge part of the reason for the debate (determinists tend to think that the human behavior can be examined experimentally and reductively to reveal its underlying causes while indeterminist believe that all that is revealed are interesting correlations).

An answer to the free will question is like an answer to a question about your religious beliefs - an affirmative or negative answer says nothing in itself until you start to consider the evidence for and the quality of the beliefs you tie to that answer. My determinism is influenced by behavioral genetics and neuroscience, so I am probably not a compatibilist in the sense that Roger Bissell is.

Cheers,
Laj.

Post 2

Friday, July 15, 2005 - 9:54am

Mr. Bissell,

"Causality is the relation between an entity and its actions, not attributes ..."
and "Every action is the action of an entity, not of an action, not of an attribute... "

Does this not split existence and identity?

An entity is it's attributes (it's identity).

An additional question:
Do you equate 'entity' with 'existent'? If so, are the following entities?:

Virtual particles, spacetime, quantum foam (if it exists), electromagnetic waves...
Don't care for modern physics? Ok, how about some everyday things:
The atmosphere, the space between galaxies, stars, or planets, the coastline of Britain, the Mediterranean sea...

Post 3

Friday, July 15, 2005 - 10:18am

Roger, great essay. Though I have a few responses ...

Intellectual criticism of Bisselian determinism:
--------------
Cause and effect...is a universal law of reality. Every action has a cause (the cause is the nature of the entity which acts); and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity, under the same circumstances, will perform the same action).” (Peikoff, OPAR, p. 15, emphasis mine) This means that human beings will also, under the same circumstances, perform the same action ...
--------------
While this may be correct 'to the letter,' it is not correct 'in spirit.' To give an example of this enlightened dynamic (of something being right to the letter, and wrong in spirit) -- I need go off on a tangent:

An example of something conceptually right and experientially wrong -- is the Energy Balance Equation (Energy in - Energy out = Energy Balance), that is used by doctors and dieticians in order to predict/control obesity. As it turns out, use of the equation leads to error -- not because it is conceptually wrong however, but because of dynamics INHERENT TO human metabolism, which unaccounted for in human interpretation and application of the equation. A calorie is NOT a calorie in the human body (protein calories, for example, are preferentially wasted when overconsumed; ie. they DO NOT afford the same positive energy balance as the other macronutrients do).

Taking this theme (that we can know facts -- but, at the same time, not understand them well enough to productively apply them to our lives) and directing it toward your statement above:

-----------------
... human beings will also, under the same circumstances, perform the same action ...
-----------------

... a glaring omission (like the omission of the differential physiological uses of energy above) comes up. It all turns on your term "same circumstances." This term is like a rationalist schematism, which conceptually postulates folks as static summations of thought and experience -- at one point in time. In reality, the preferential focus of individual humans will re-direct their responses to the same EXTERNAL circumstances -- as they learn and grow. Now if, to the letter, you are correct -- then how do we reconcile that with the fact of self-same individuals responding differently to the same EXTERNAL circumstances; except to postulate that individuals learn and grow (ie. change, often for the better).

Surely, you may counter this criticism with the same line of reasoning: claiming that I, too, am utilizing a rationalist (single-point-in-time summation) schematism -- and claiming that there is never a case where EXTERNAL circumstances ARE identical (so that I can never get proof that self-same individuals acted differently under the self-same circumstances). But I have enough of proof of growth in humans -- I don't NEED to infer single-point-in-time summations to justify my point (but YOU do need them to justify YOUR point).

Being in charge of our own focus, we can direct our own growth. We can become beings who respond to the same EXTERNAL circumstances, in a much different manner than we have done before. We can learn to "act otherwise."

If we're in charge of our own focus, then we're in charge of our own future.

Ed

----------------
p.s. Roger, I'd accept value-determinism if you allow for value-validation (and invalidation) via rational focus --as outlined by Eric Mack in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand. What do you say Roger, can we eventually invalidate some of our own values, or not?

Post 4

Saturday, July 16, 2005 - 1:32am

I will comment on this passage: "I read Dr. Machan's Initiative, and I wasn't impressed. The book seemed more to me like a rationalization of a preconceived notions than an inquiry into the thornier issues surrounding the debate. In Machan's book, there is no discussion of the limitations of introspection, or the problems scientists and philosophers have had defining the 'self', the latter being a huge part of the reason for the debate (determinists tend to think that the human behavior [sic] can be examined experimentally and reductively to reveal its underlying causes while indeterminist believe that all that is revealed are interesting correlations)."
If one knew better what the author of these lines has done in terms of hard philosophical work, one could take such ex-cathedra pronouncements seriously. Alas, they are but expressions of unfounded opinion, without even a bit of evidence, without as much as one line of argument. It is as if some Joe off the street chimed in about Dennett's book, Elbow Room, saying the same thing about it--how on earth is one to know whether the claim has any merit? One would just have to go and read Dennett's book. (Maybe the author's friends could benefit from this, kind of like mine do when I recommend a movie, because of personal knowledge and confidence.)
To charge an author with rationalization--which is to say the pretense of giving reasons so as to make it appear one's beliefs have merit when, in fact, the beliefs merely serve to disguise the pursuit of personal advantage or bias--is pretty serious and when it goes unsupported by any evidence it is an ad hominem. From someone who supposedly takes Objectivism, with its stress on reason and argument, seriously, it is worse. Again, unless we had some inkling of the brilliance and wisdom of this author, independently of his or her assurances, the testimonial that he or she "wasn't impressed" is useless. (If I heard from, say, John Searle or Ed Pols the same thing, it would have some prima facie merit, given what those folks are widely known to have achieved in this area of investigation.)
(For a more reliable and less gossipy discussion of Initiative, see the critical review of it, and my reply, in JARS, a couple or so years ago. For more on this topic from me, see The Pseudo-Science of B. F. Skinner [1974].)
Finally, in a more substantive vein, consider that the concept "rationalization" presupposes that one might have engaged in bona fide reasoning, instead. Indeed, to accuse one of having engaged in rationalization presupposes that it would have been better, more appropriate, right, to engage in bona fide reasoning. But this then assume one had a choice about it--one chose badly by engaging in rationalization. Now this is a perfect illustration of the stolen concept fallacy and, also, the famous determinist's dilemma. The former involves using a concept while denying its conceptual base--using "ought to engage in bona fide reasoning" but denying that one can choose whether to engage in such reasoning--while the latter involves affirming determinism while urging others to choose to reject free will. No amount of compatibilist epicycling is going to rescue one from these pitfalls. (It is, at least psychologically, very interesting to find so many determinists, including especially Dennett, engaging in moral finger-wagging. Recall his now infamous column proposing the establishment of a group labeled "Brights" which would include him and his pals in the secular humanist community. Talk about ad hominems substituting for arguments!)

(Edited by Machan on 7/16, 2:09am)

Post 5

Saturday, July 16, 2005 - 2:14am

Could we please nip this "Bissellian determinism" business in the bud right now? You're slandering an otherwise respectable (at least, somewhat) surname!

Post 6

Saturday, July 16, 2005 - 7:02am

Sadly the determinist temptation is a strong one. It has many sources, so it is difficult to nip it. Some folks see their family members caught in a spiral of misfortune, mismanagement, and distress and the temptation is to see no personal responsibility involved. (I know, I've been there big time myself. Indeed, not only family but my very own history tempts me to explain away bad judgments and behavior.) Then there are more philosophical sources of the temptation. But what is so interesting to me is that quite a few determinists are insistent moralists, as well (although Roger Bissell is an exception). And they do not seem to appreciate the paradox of this--if you really couldn't have done otherwise, what's the point of crediting or condemning any action, conduct or institutions other than in the amoral sense in which one laments bad weather or an earthquake? What is the point, even, of construing one's intellectual adversaries' (intellectual) conduct "wrong," as if they could have gotten it right? OK, so be it, but then why not follow one's own counsel and remain silent in the department of praise and blame and simply lament?

Post 7

Saturday, July 16, 2005 - 7:42am

Is this the philosophic equivalent of the person who act as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.

Just one example: #3 in the article. He quotes Peikoff and then adds his "This means." Now an entity becomes "human beingS" and universal law becomes like one of the 10 commandments. Interestingly Roger uses "..." to replace one word, "therefore." I guess he "determined" for us not to read the pervious paragraph which change "Roger's" context of the Peikoff quote.

Peikoff:"Thus, under ordinary circumstances, if a child releases a balloon filled with helium, only one outcome is possible: the balloon will rise. If he releases a second balloon filled with sand, the nature of the entity is different, and so is it action"

That changes everything, but that was probably his point.

While the sentence after that Peikoff quote destroys Roger's use of "universal."

Peikoff:"The above is not to be taken as a proof of the law of cause and effect."

If Roger is determined to change the context of quotes without telling us, he'll believe in determinism.

Post 8

Saturday, July 16, 2005 - 10:18am

What is the point, even, of construing one's intellectual adversaries' (intellectual) conduct "wrong," as if they could have gotten it right? OK, so be it, but then why not follow one's own counsel and remain silent in the department of praise and blame and simply lament?

Maybe because one's counsel was never that one could have gotten it right in the libertarian sense of "could"?
Maybe because one is determined to do so?
Maybe because one doesn't have sufficient insight into the causes of the behavior of others to act like Machan claims that one's [purported] counsel is advocating?

I guess I must be missing something when I consider these obvious answers.

Anyways, I've stated my views and I think that there was nothing in Dr. Machan's post #4 addressing the substantive elements of my post, and a lot addressing my evaluation of his work and whether I am qualified to make the comments that I did. I have no reputation to speak of. My reputation on SOLO is my posts.

I currently have no desire or need to perpetuate a cycle of ad hominem debate, even if I started it, especially when the substantive criticisms I made were not addressed. I called Dr. Machan's book a "rationalization" because he didn't lay out the issues surrounding determinism in a way most scientific determinists would agree with before discussing the issues. Anyone who compares Machan's sustained polemic against determinism to Dennett's discussion of why determinism is feared, why free will is desired, and how best to resolve the issues, is free to make up his mind as to what approach he prefers.

I've made up my mind and unabashedly stated my opinion. I do not apologize for it, and I will debate the issue with anyone at any time or place in August.

Cheers,

Laj.

(Edited by Abolaji Ogunshola on 7/16, 10:20am)

Post 9

Sunday, July 17, 2005 - 8:53pm

My friend, Tibor Machan, wrote: "I am not sure when Rand offered up her definition of man as "a being of volitional consciousness," but it is certainly implicit in everything she has been writing since AS in which she tells us, via Galt, that instead of "I think, therefore I am," "I am, therefore I will think" should be accepted as a sound philosophical motto."

I would expand upon this (thus ruining Galt's neat, succinct twist on Descartes) as: "I am a rational being, and I desire to live according to my nature's requirements, therefore I will think." To me, volition is not "I could have done otherwise than I did, period," but "I could have done otherwise than I did, if I had chosen to." In other words, I hold not with (what appears to be) Rand's (and Peikoff's) categorical model of volition, but instead with a conditional model of volition -- and for much the same reasons that I hold not with Kant's categorical model of ethics ("you should do such and such, just because"), but instead with Rand's conditional model of ethics ("you should do such and such, if you want such and such a result").

I try to consistently eschew the quasi-religious "just because, period" approach to both the nature of ethics and the nature of volition. That is where I think the debate should begin.

Tibor again: "This, as well as her ethical stance that states that we ought to attend to the world with our minds, which is a matter of choice, pretty much puts her on the free will side of the debate. ("Ought" implies "can".)"

But is it, "we ought to attend to the world with our minds, period," or "we ought to attend to the world with our minds, if we want to live successfully (be happy, etc.)"? If we more strongly desire to live successfully &c than to do something else, and we understand that doing so requires that we attend to the world with our minds, and that we can freely do so, then -- barring disease or coercion, etc. -- we will do so. That is the respect in which our free choice to focus is determined by our values.

That is why I am a compatibilist. Rather than trying to fit the round peg of categorical volition in the square hold of determinism, I instead equate conditional volition very specifically with value determinism. I honestly don't see how people can operate as self-determining beings otherwise.

Tibor again: "Free will is required also in her epistemology, since the formation of concepts is never automatic but something everyone must initiate."

No argument here. All living beings initiate the actions that result in their survival. Human beings are able to initiate not only metabolic and physical actions, but also actions of their consciousness. But it is not their consciousnesses or minds or wills that initiate those actions. It is those human beings!

Tibor again: "I suppose we can engage in a quarrel about what is primary, what is not in Objectivism, but in such an ethically pregnant philosophy as Rand's, free will cannot be dropped--too much else depends on this human capacity."

I understand that many people do not see how ethics is possible without categorical free will, and believe that "freedom to choose, just because" is a necessary condition of ethics. But if there is not some superior value determining one's choice in a given context, then one's choice is arbitrary and thus devoid of moral worth (isn't it?). I see ethics as Rand does, as a code of values guiding the actions of one's life. But it tells you what are the necessary conditions to your living and being happy -- what you must do if you want to live successfully and be happy, and the "if" has primacy here. If you didn't want those things, where would be the motivating power behind the "ought"?

That is why I reject both Kantian categorical ethics and Randian categorical volition, and why I further believe that Randian categorical volition implies Kantian categorical ethics. (Yes, Rand's and Peikoff's view of volition as categorical undercuts their view of ethics as conditional.)

Tibor again: "In both of [my own two books, The Pseudo-Science of B. F. Skinner (1974) and Initiative--Human Agency and Society (2000)], I address the effort to combine any bona fide ethics with any determinism of the sort that renders "could have done otherwise, all things being equal other than the agent's act of initiative," impossible."

Well, what motivated "the agent's act of initiative"? Isn't it the fact that, at that point in time, despite whatever "official" values he might espouse, he actually valued doing what he did more than what he didn't do? How is initiative incompatible with value determinism? In my view, our values -- which often shift in their relative weighting to one another -- are the only possible explanation for our choices of action.

Tibor again: "(Nor is it kosher to put in an aside about how volition is something mystical, without argument. Given its ontological base in the fact of multiple types of causes in nature, a la Aristotle and Joseph, Rand sure as heck didn't construe volition mystical!)"

"Could have done otherwise, period," is mystical as construed by Rand and Peikoff. It is categorical volition, which is tantamount to unexplained whim. The parallel to Kant's mystical, intrinsicist categorical view of ethics is inescapable -- and the antidote is the same as Rand's this-worldly, objective, conditional view of ethics. That is, I am arguing that Objectivism should properly embrace conditional volition, "could have done otherwise, if I had desired and chosen differently than I did."

Tibor again: "Finally, the issue really isn't whether one is or is not a bona fide Objectivists but whether the Objectivist, Randian idea that human beings are beings of volitional consciousness is true."

I do not quarrel with the idea that human beings are volitional. I just want to strip away the mystical, intrinsicist, arbitrary element of "freedom to choose, just because." There ain't no such animal!

Best to all,
REB

Post 10

Sunday, July 17, 2005 - 9:07pm

Jeff Perren wrote (quoting me): ""Causality is the relation between an entity and its actions, not attributes ..."and "Every action is the action of an entity, not of an action, nor of an attribute... " Does this not split existence and identity? An entity is it's attributes (it's identity)."

Not at all. An entity is all of its attributes. So, while you can (if you want to be needlessly wordy) say that "causality is the relation between all of an entity's attributes and its actions," or "every action is the action of all of an entity's attributes," there are certain things you cannot say.

You cannot say that "causality is the relation between one (or another) of an entity's attributes and its actions." That would be a split of existence and identity. The entity is indivisible from all of its attributes, so it cannot be referred to as if it were just one of its attributes. Thus, you cannot say that mind (an attribute of humans) causes actions of humans.

And you cannot say that "every action is the action of one (or another) of an entity's attributes." Again, that would be a split of existence and identity. And for the same reason as above, you cannot say that every action of a human is the action of mind (an attribute of humans).

Jeff again: "An additional question: Do you equate 'entity' with 'existent'? If so, are the following entities?: Virtual particles, spacetime, quantum foam (if it exists), electromagnetic waves...Don't care for modern physics? Ok, how about some everyday things: The atmosphere, the space between galaxies, stars, or planets, the coastline of Britain, the Mediterranean sea..."

No, I do not equate "entity" and "existent." I regard "existent" as the genus and "entity," "attribute," "action," and "relationship" (and others) as species or categories of existents. Also, "characteristic" is the genus and "attribute," "action," and "relationship" (etc.) are species or categories of characteristics. Yes, there is overlap between "existent" and "characteristic," which is as it should be, since an existent is its characteristics.

As for your Rogues Gallery of challenging...existents...I will pass on which ones (if any) to categorize as entities. :-)

Best to all,
REB

Post 11

Sunday, July 17, 2005 - 9:23pm

Ed Thompson wrote: "Roger, great essay. Though I have a few responses ...

"Intellectual criticism of Bisselian determinism:
--------------
"Cause and effect...is a universal law of reality. Every action has a cause (the cause is the nature of the entity which acts); and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity, under the same circumstances, will perform the same action).” (Peikoff, OPAR, p. 15, emphasis mine) This means that human beings will also, under the same circumstances, perform the same action ...

"Taking this theme (that we can know facts -- but, at the same time, not understand them well enough to productively apply them to our lives) and directing it toward your statement above:

-----------------
... human beings will also, under the same circumstances, perform the same action ...
-----------------

"... a glaring omission (like the omission of the differential physiological uses of energy above) comes up. It all turns on your term "same circumstances." This term is like a rationalist schematism, which conceptually postulates folks as static summations of thought and experience -- at one point in time. In reality, the preferential focus of individual humans will re-direct their responses to the same EXTERNAL circumstances -- as they learn and grow. Now if, to the letter, you are correct -- then how do we reconcile that with the fact of self-same individuals responding differently to the same EXTERNAL circumstances; except to postulate that individuals learn and grow (ie. change, often for the better).

"Surely, you may counter this criticism with the same line of reasoning: claiming that I, too, am utilizing a rationalist (single-point-in-time summation) schematism -- and claiming that there is never a case where EXTERNAL circumstances ARE identical (so that I can never get proof that self-same individuals acted differently under the self-same circumstances). But I have enough of proof of growth in humans -- I don't NEED to infer single-point-in-time summations to justify my point (but YOU do need them to justify YOUR point)."

Well, of course! If the circumstances could be identical, the actions would be the same -- but "there is never a case where external circumstances are identical". The real point of the Law of Causality, however, is not that the "same circumstances" determine the "same action" -- this is a schema that we use to good benefit in physics, taking circumstances to be relevantly the same -- but that a given circumstance determines a given action. In assessing human choice and action, we must employ this latter form of the Law of Causality, or else we will run aground on the rocks of the subtleties and complexities of human psychology (values) and physiology. We might make some good guesses, observing another's choices from "the outside," but when a person's value-conflicts are not entirely known to us, we cannot really know the circumstances of his choice in its entirety. Thus, we have to fall back on the Law of Causality telling us that he chose as he did because of the given circumstances, including, of course, his strongest operative value in that situation.

Ed again: "Being in charge of our own focus, we can direct our own growth. We can become beings who respond to the same EXTERNAL circumstances, in a much different manner than we have done before. We can learn to "act otherwise." If we're in charge of our own focus, then we're in charge of our own future. Ed

----------------
"p.s. Roger, I'd accept value-determinism if you allow for value-validation (and invalidation) via rational focus --as outlined by Eric Mack in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand. What do you say Roger, can we eventually invalidate some of our own values, or not?"

Yes, we can "learn to 'act otherwise,'" but only if we more strongly value doing so than the status quo. And yes, we can use rational focus to validate or invalidate our values, but only if we more strongly value doing so than leaving our values the way they were.

Best to all,
REB

Post 12

Sunday, July 17, 2005 - 9:28pm

Andrew Bissell wrote: "Could we please nip this "Bissellian determinism" business in the bud right now? You're slandering an otherwise respectable (at least, somewhat) surname!"

Now, now, I'm sure Sally Rand (the (in)famous fan dancer) had the same reaction to talk of "Randian Objectivism." :-)

Glenn I. Heppard wrote: "Is this the philosophic equivalent of the person who act as his own lawyer has a fool for a client."

No, but I do prepare my own taxes. :-)

Best to all,
REB

Post 13

Sunday, July 17, 2005 - 9:49pm

Roger,

Good article and I'm glad your post grew into it.

I always get confused by a bunch of "isms." The determinism you talk about always seems to refer to something in the past with an "ought" or "could" tacked on..

I like the conditional volition approach, however. Still, I do not see Rand promoting a categorical use of volition. From my understanding, what she normally talks about when she gets seemingly "categorical" volition-wise still can be posited as conditional. It only comes off that way because the prioritization of her values is extremely well defined, thus not permitting one value to substitute another on an equal footing. For her, many times there was only one way because the importance of that grounds for that way already had been chosen.

Michael

Post 14

Monday, July 18, 2005 - 8:03am

Machan refers to "The Double Aspect Theory of Mind" by Bissell. This is of course now online at Reason Papers' website, here: http://www.reasonpapers.com/archives.htm#v1.

Another very interesting article is Charles Ripley, Sperry's Concept of Consciousness, a copy of which Machan kindly sent me long ago.

The problem I have always had with the notion of volition is that it does seem to require a type of "downward causation," which notion continues to disturb me. I think Sperry has some thoughts along these lines, as does David Kelley in an old taped lecture series on free will.

Assuming the subatomic constituents of the brain are indeed governed by the 4 physical forces--gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces--then the position of the particles that make up the brain over time are dependent on mechanistic forces. Even if there is an uncertainty aspect, that just adds randomness. Our behavior is clearly a manifestation of the movement of the particles of our bodies. It seems to me undeniable that to have true volition, one's "mind" or "brain" as a whole must influence the motion of the particles that make it up. But it seems to me that this implies that if one were to examine on a subatomic level, the particles inside the brain, then take a given particle: its path must not be influenced solely by the 4 forces; if it is, then we are determined (or, at best, semi-random), not volitional.

So I cannot help but believe that if there is really volition, it is as if there is a fifth physical force that is exerting change on the particles of the brain. But where does this come from? If it is really a fifth force, why could it not be studied by physicists? If it could, then again, we would be determined, but by 5 instead of 4 forces, and we are back where we started from. It seems to me that one must posit an almost magical or spooky occurence to get to volition. Just as "God" is never quite defined consistently so that theists can have their cake and eat it too, so volitionists seem to want to have it both ways. They want to deny that the 4 physical forces are not sufficient to calculate the position of atoms in your brain (if they are, we are determined); so this implies downward causation; which would imply a fifth force, but the volitionists want to deny this fifth force, because that would again imply determinism. It's as if they want something vague and magical that is left unexplained, some spooky way of mediating between "choice" and its "downward" effect on the particles of the brain.

Post 15

Monday, July 18, 2005 - 8:33am

Stephan, you seem determined.

Ed

Post 16

Monday, July 18, 2005 - 9:33am

Stephan,

The flaw in your argument is that there are many systems for which the physical results are causal, but indeterminable (soft causality). This is not only true for quantum effects, but also for classical chaotic systems with Lyapunov instability.

Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine has written a book "The End of Certainty" detailing how quantum and classical perturbations "bubble up" through thermodynamically irreversible reactions in far from equilibrium chemical systems. These systems can conceivably give rise to top-down control mechanisms which are not controlled from the bottom.

Jim

Post 17

Monday, July 18, 2005 - 10:16am

James-the-hyphenate wrote, "The flaw in your argument is that there are many systems for which the physical results are causal, but indeterminable (soft causality). This is not only true for quantum effects, but also for classical chaotic systems with Lyapunov instability."

As I said our actions, if not completley determinate b/co f a random aspect, still don't allow for volition. A particle in my brain goes this way instead of that. For me to make a choice, it would have to go that way instead of this; something causes it to change from what it would have done. This is the essential point that seems to be evaded. And something must force or push the particle in the different direction.

Now I for one am not a believer in ESP, telepathy, telekinesis, etc. But basically it seems to me that the idea of downward causation is tantamount to telekinesis.

"Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine has written a book "The End of Certainty" detailing how quantum and classical perturbations "bubble up" through thermodynamically irreversible reactions in far from equilibrium chemical systems. These systems can conceivably give rise to top-down control mechanisms which are not controlled from the bottom."

I don't see how this assertion changes the point made above. To the extent his is not merely a metaphor, then it seems to be a spooky thing.

Post 18

Monday, July 18, 2005 - 11:34am

Stephan,

The most determinate aspect of living things, the DNA molecule is determinate not by the random motions of particles, but by the information it contains. Similarly, if I hear a certain aggregate of sound waves my reaction to it will be due to the information it contains not the random motions of the particles themselves and there are many dissimilar patterns physically at the bottom that my brain interprets as being the same. So there are emergent patterns that are causal for other reasons than their physical makeup at the bottom. This should not be surprising.

Jim

Post 19

Monday, July 18, 2005 - 2:25pm