Objectivism and Determinism
by Roger E. Bissell
Who qualifies as an Objectivist? I think that’s a legitimate question, but I also think that it’s too easy to pick one’s own pet list of views that can qualify one as being or not being an Objectivist. (E.g., Rand’s views on a woman President, on homosexuality, on anarchism vs. limited government in politics, on survival vs. flourishing in ethics, etc.) Nathaniel Branden has pointed out (correctly, in my opinion, as evidenced by comments Rand made in her journals) that Rand held a “minimalist” view of the Objectivist metaphysics. Well, I think that what qualifies a person as “Objectivist” should also be termed most generally and succinctly. Apparently Rand agreed with this, also.
For instance, in “About the Author” in the appendix to Atlas Shrugged, Rand said, “My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute.” Do you agree with that? Then you agree with Rand’s written statement of the essence of her philosophy. Wouldn’t that mean that you are, in essence, an Objectivist?
Or, at the sales conference at Random House, preceding the publication of Atlas Shrugged, Rand presented the essence of her philosophy “while standing on one foot.” She said: “1. Metaphysics: Objective Reality (‘Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed’ or ‘Wishing won’t make it so.’) 2. Epistemology: Reason (‘You can’t have your cake and eat it, too.’) 3. Ethics: Self-Interest (‘Man is an end in himself.’) 4. Politics: Capitalism (‘Give me liberty or give me death.’)” Do you agree with these principles? Then you agree with Rand’s verbal statement of the essence of her philosophy. Wouldn’t that mean that you are, in essence, an Objectivist?
Later, in 1962, in her column “Introducing Objectivism,” Rand gave “the briefest summary” of her philosophy: “1. Reality exists as an objective absolute—facts are facts, independent of man's feelings, wishes, hopes or fears. 2. Reason (the faculty which identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses) is man’s only means of perceiving reality, his only source of knowledge, his only guide to action, and his basic means of survival. 3. Man—every man—is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others. He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life. 4. The ideal political-economic system is laissez-faire capitalism. It is a system where men deal with one another, not as victims and executioners, nor as masters and slaves, but as traders, by free, voluntary exchange to mutual benefit. It is a system where no man may obtain any values from others by resorting to physical force, and no man may initiate the use of physical force against others. The government acts only as a policeman that protects man’s rights; it uses physical force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use, such as criminals or foreign invaders. In a system of full capitalism, there should be (but, historically, has not yet been) a complete separation of state and economics, in the same way and for the same reasons as the separation of state and church.” Do you agree with Rand’s summary of her philosophy? If so, aren’t you an Objectivist?
Finally, in “Brief Summary” (1971), Rand said: “If one recognizes the supremacy of reason and applies it consistently, all the rest [e.g., capitalism and egoism] follows. This—the supremacy of reason—was, is and will be the primary concern of my work, and the essence of Objectivism.” Do you agree with this statement about the supremacy and consistent application of reason? Then you agree with Rand on the essence of Objectivism. Are you then an Objectivist?
Now, note: not one of the preceding summaries or essential statements mentioned the issue of free will vs. determinism, nor the idea that reason is volitional, in the sense of “could have done otherwise.” Yet, even if you answered “yes” to all of the foregoing litmus tests for being an Objectivist, you would still, in the minds of many Rand followers, not qualify as an Objectivist, if you also accepted the doctrine of determinism, the doctrine that implies that one could not have done otherwise than one did in a given situation.
Unlike many Objectivists, I maintain that rationality includes volition, in the sense of the self-aware monitoring and directing of one's mental processes, while also maintaining that, in any given situation, one could not have done otherwise than one did in that situation. In addition to me, numerous supporters of the essence of Rand’s philosophy also hold some variant of this view, sometimes known as “soft determinism” or “compatibilism.” Is the standard Objectivist view of free will correct, or is free will or volition compatible with determinism, as I and others argue that it is? I think the jury is still out on this question, and that any attempt to limit Objectivism to those holding the view that volition and determinism are incompatible is premature at best. In the comments that follow, I will briefly explore why I think they are compatible, and why determinism is compatible with Objectivism.
There are three fundamental premises of Objectivism, all of which logically and developmentally precede, and one of which logically contradicts, the standard Objectivist claim that man’s volition consists in the ability to have acted otherwise than he did in any given situation. They all, furthermore, are consistent with the primacy of existence, the view that consciousness is not metaphysically active—i.e., does not create or control existence—but instead is epistemologically active, being man’s awareness of existence.
1. Every action is the action of an entity, not of an action, not of an attribute (such as consciousness). [See Peikoff, OPAR, p. 15] Thus, it is absurd to speak of “actions of consciousness.” Instead, these are conscious actions of entities, especially, in this context, conscious human entities.
2. Causality is the relation between an entity and its actions, not attributes (such as consciousness) and actions—that entities (not attributes, such as consciousness) are the cause of their actions. [See Peikoff, OPAR, p. 16] Thus, it is absurd to speak of the “causal efficacy of consciousness,” as if it were an entity that has the power to do things. (The same applies, by the way, to talk of “the will” doing things or making things happen.) Instead, what has causal efficacy (the power to do things) are entities, especially in this context conscious human entities.
3. “Cause and effect...is a universal law of reality. Every action has a cause (the cause is the nature of the entity which acts); and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity, under the same circumstances, will perform the same action).” (Peikoff, OPAR, p. 15, emphasis mine) This means that human beings will also, under the same circumstances, perform the same action. And why will they do so? Because that is the nature of cause and effect as a universal law of reality. Humans are not exempt, despite our prodigious powers of reason and self-aware, deliberate control (volition) of our reason. Thus, it is absurd to say that a human being “could have done otherwise” than he did in a given situation. By the nature of cause and effect, a given action must be performed in a given situation.
These three fundamental Objectivist metaphysical premises together logically rule out the kind of “free will” that most Objectivists believe in, the “could have done otherwise” brand of volition. Instead, volition must be understood as value-determined, conditional, epistemic freedom of choice, in contrast to the presently accepted model of indeterministic, categorical, ontological freedom of choice. Hence, it follows that some form of determinism is true. But not environmental or genetic determinism.
Instead, what is implied by basic Objectivist metaphysical premises is “self-determinism,” the view that one’s actions (including the act of focusing one’s awareness) are determined by one's values/desires/ideas. For short, I call it “value-determinism.” And although it does not qualify as “free will” in the sense of “could have done otherwise,” that is not valid, anyway. But it does qualify as “free will” in the sense of one’s being the originator of that action, absent environmental duress and physical or medical impairment. One’s capacity to will to do something is free of control by anything other than one’s own values. Conditional free will is thus compatible with determinism of a kind that does not require predeterminism or fatalism, and that does not preclude knowledge and correction of error.
To conclude: in nearly every thumbnail sketch of Objectivism given before volition was elevated in the 1970s to its present quasi-mystical status (of categorical freedom of choice, rather than conditional freedom of choice) I found absolutely nothing to disagree with. In Rand’s very sparse, minimalist framework of her philosophy, there are five or six very simple tenets: objective reality, reason, rational self-interest, life as the standard of value, man's rights, and laissez-faire capitalism. And I disagree with none of these principles—though, as noted, I certainly do disagree with what are some of the implications of those ideas.
And speaking just for myself, I want Rand's system to be consistent and true, and I have been working hard for over 35 years to make it so. The fact that others disagree with me, at times bitterly, is disheartening, but that’s life. I’m not in this to please others. I’m in it for my own happiness, and I’ve managed to achieve it, even as an Objectivist, at times! I have thought of myself an Objectivist in terms of the methodology and the minimalist set of basic principles, and I think I have given adequate justification for doing so. Most orthodox Objectivists, and some non-Objectivists in the Randian milieu, however, seem to want to deny that this is enough to qualify me as one. Some have suggested that I instead refer to myself as a Neo-Objectivist, others as a "Bissellist." Har. I think that, in the same respect that I regard myself as an Aristotelian, I am also most accurately described as a Randian, so that is my preferred label these days.
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