RoR: Forum

Michael,

Rand herself defined pride as that virtue which watches out over the other virtues and evaluates them. She believed that the consequence of pride was self-esteem.

And I agree with you that a person can have a large amount of self-esteem without being perfect. We are all walking examples of that, eh?!

Post 61

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 10:34am

John,

I keep having questions, because we seem to be coming back to the same problems with -- well, maybe with the precision of the language we use, the words we choose, the definitions we don't give. I think that's the problem sometimes.

Then, there is the problem that so many of us bring the package-deal of religion=morality to the whole issue. So that the moment that we hear "be morally perfect" or "it's possible to be morally perfect" or, perhaps the biggest offence "so-and-so thinks they're morally perfect" we get all in a huff, remembering those images of Jesus looking down on us from Sunday School walls or the nun, ruler at the ready. The last, in particular, seems to raise the most ire. Moral egalitarianism running through the Objectivist culture. "How dare she/he claim to be the authority? I mean, look at what she's/he's done?" often followed by finger waiving in the direction of some, ultimately unexamined, action or conclusion that's supposed to be self-evidently evil.

Let me give you some examples from your post.

What is "excessive" self-monitoring? Is there a time factor involved or a "I'm so confused I can't function" factor? The first doesn't seem to make sense and the second elicits an "isn't it about time to take the time to get un-confused?" from me. Or maybe you had something else in mind. What?

How is "self-monitoring" the same as "worrying about the moral status of my soul." My notion -- and it may not be yours, of course -- of self-monitoring, is something like a continuous feedback loop that asks "how am I doing on this task" If I'm doing writing exercises, for example, that amounts to an awareness of what I'm doing IN THE EXERCISE and noticing whether my mind is elsewhere or not, whether I'm allowing my subconscious to follow the instructions I've given it, etc. That act of self monitoring IS the act of being moral. The moral process IS the rational process. There's no separate process that takes time away from the task at hand. If you do take time for the inspection of your day to review what you got done and if you did it well and if you made the right decisions for your life -- that all is a moral process. There is no separate platonic ideal "moral state" that we have to concentrate on (isn't that where we all agree?" "Spending mental energy" -- whether on "worrying about your finances" or "worrying about whether you promoted your own flourishing today" -- is all part of the moral process. So what is it you see as the problem?

What exactly is a "moral state?" My understanding of Objectivism is that a moral state is an aware state. Are you actually advocating that we should not be concerned with whether or not we are aware? Or that we should not "evaluate" our state of awareness or our commitment to being aware? I really don't think you are, but I really am not clear what you are advocating if that isn't it.

Tom

Post 62

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 10:52am

David, I think that your post 58 is spot on.

The underlying theme seems to be that virtues and values already come pre-packaged together (or that one already entails the other)--and that it is up to us to merely integrate them into our lives; at those times and places that we think most important.

I think that a fundamental difference of focus here (which gives rise to the 2 sides of this debate) is that one side takes a more Aristotelian view of moral perfection, and the other side of the debate--seeing the past human errors of interpretation and application of Rand; e.g. "psychologizing", premature moral condemnation, etc--adopts this faulty view as if it were the only possible, and then rightfully criticizes it.

The conundrum seems to be that one might have to have already built up character before it is "safe" to read Rand--either due to her writing style or to that which she was reacting against when she wrote. Perhaps using Nicomachean Ethics as background to, or springboard for, jumping into Rand--might solve this dilemma for most people, most of the time.

As a testament to this concern, view what Jack Wheeler had to say (in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand) about the different depictions of morality found in Aristotle and in Rand:

----------
"The author must admit that he so often finds the stately elegance, the extraordinary depth of courteous analysis, and most especially the profound temperament of reason exhibited on every page of the Nicomachean Ethics a welcome relief to the incessant bombast and continuous venting of Randian rage."
----------

Though I do not fully agree with Wheeler's summation (indeed, under the right circumstances "rage" can become an appropriately moral choice), I do think that Robert Bidinotto has accepted Wheeler's view of Randian morality without adopting Aristotle's in its stead--is that right Robert?

On what moral perfection is:

Here's an analogy that speaks to my conception of moral perfection:

Nobody drives their car perfectly straight--and, if you did, then you would not need to make those subtle adjustments that you make, while steering your car down the road.

Staying in the driving lane is moral. Crossing the dividing line (into opposite traffic) is immoral. Maintaining you car in the CENTER of your lane is a morally perfecting act. Working to maintain your car in the center of the lane allows for a wide range, or margin, of error.

Having this new, diligently maintained, margin of error allows for a higher threshold of adversity or distraction before any harm may befall you (say, for instance, the steering goes out and you have to brake as quickly as possible, but your car will still proceed somewhat furthe--in the exact direction it was pointing!).

This analogy is not entirely appropriate, because it focuses on avoiding the negative (and this is not the case with a correct view of morality, which has primary focus on building up the positive). Other analogies, such as games of skill played at the Fair, where a prize is awarded to those who excel speaks to this.

I'm thinking of a particularly strong example--a game where you shoot a continuous stream of water into a small hole and that makes your "horse & rider" race up a track; as long as you hold the water stream in the right spot (not too much to the left, not too much to the right, etc).

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 4/22, 10:56am)

Post 63

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 11:00am

Tom,

You are right in equating self monitoring, with a reality based awareness, "how am I doing at this?, have I done enough?, what do i need to do?" are all questions that come to mind. Mindfullness (without the buddhist connotation) is what it is.

But what can happen is that this process can become anxiety ridden, and results in unearned shame or paralysis. This is what I meant by excessive. And in this I am not trying to pin down a definitive principle, I am just chatting...and thinking out loud. Thats the great thing about the forum.

The result of the excessive, neurotic self monitoring, is an evaluation of a "moral state": " I am *fill in the blank*" which often gets in the way of correction, and getting back to what this whole thing is about - seeking values and flourishing.

John

Post 64

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 12:02pm

Tom,

I liked your metaphor of the feedback loop and your comment of "how am I doing at this" in your discussion of the "excessive" self monitoring. Nice.

I think you're right on and that that takes away the perceived negative connotation of the monitoring issue.

John,

You are right that the monitoring process can be nerveracking, but that usually happens if we don't have our values straight in our head and if we are not cleaned out psychoepistemologically. That, of course, leads to the obvious question of: How do we get our values straight and our psyche worked out? The short answer is that whenever we feel something is wrong, we should try to track down the problem and fix it. And we should try to figure out what is important to pursue in our lives and how much time to allot to it. The long answer is veeeeeeery long.

Post 65

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 12:08pm

Thanks, Ed,

I agree that it certainly wouldn't hurt for someone to have at least an implicit or explicit sympathy with the Nicomachean ethics. Otherwise, changing character would be a massive undertaking!

I liked your analogy of driving a car down the center of a lane, allowing for bumps and the occasional winds of life to move you -- but still keeping you in your lane.

Post 66

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 1:31pm

Robert,

Thanks for your kind words and I will respect your wishes regarding the things you wrote in the 80s and mid-90s (three pieces I believe on Rand, Peikoff and T&T).

Your question regarding the "practical useful purpose" of the concept of "moral perfection" is right on the money, I think. My answer is that if we can define it and tie it to reality (i.e. avoid a floating abstraction) we can avoid any notion of "original sin" attached to "nobody's perfect". And, if we can expunge that concept from our vocabulary, that will serve the very serious practical useful purpose of eliminating the negative-expectation that somehow if someone watches TV or plays solitaire they have breached some Objectivist moral code and face excommunication for any "failure."

Now I know that your conclusion is based on what you consider "inductive evidence" of crimes far more serious, so I must admit that it is the validity of that "evidence" that is my ultimate target. But just for the record, I don't mean validity in any sense that would imply "you're lying about what you saw or heard." It's more like a detective novel where the evidence is, by itself, ambiguous and how we fill in the blanks has a lot to do with how we interpret what we saw -- oh, yes, like "Penthouse Legend". So, if I had you on the stand as a witness for the prosecution in the "Ayn Rand vs Objectivist Morality" case, I'd ask you, in her defense, just the questions I ask you here.

And isn't that what is going on in many of your posts on this and other threads (and you're not alone!). Are you not accusing Rand of not living up to her own morality? Are you not accusing her (along with Peikoff and Schwartz) of evading the truth, lying to herself, changing the principles of her philosophy to suite her or other's claims of perfection, or to rationalize the expulsion of this or that worthy thinker. Isn't that what's going on?

Now it's true, while you are not a little angry about this, you tend to wave it off on the grounds that "nobody's perfect." But this "nobody's perfect" has now become not an indictment that only covers the people you've met, but now has the clear meaning of "it's impossible for anyone to be morally perfect." (Which is what I believe you were arguing in post #20 of the original thread) There's all the difference in the world in my dictionary between "these people I've met are not morally perfect" and "nobody's perfect." And getting rid of even that small remnant of "original sin" would, in my book, be a very practical useful result,,,,,,even if Rand remains guilty. And if she does, you'll have the added satisfaction(?) of knowing that she stands out in that regard.

So, as her defense lawyer, I will be presenting an alternate version of the alleged crime.
The facts will remain, but the story around them will be questioned. And I trust that everyone around this courtroom will not begin the trial with anything less than the seriousness it deserves. This particular defense lawyer doesn't take kindly to arguments from intimidation or name calling.

Tom

Post 67

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 3:33pm

Michael,

Yep, it was three out of four we agreed on.

On the virtue of pride, I think you're right that pride is felt -- as when we say "I feel proud of that performance." But I do think that perhaps Rand had in mind the picture of a hero "standing proud" -- i.e. that a good man has that emotion as one of his (earned) attributes.
If I remember correctly -- and I remember it being mentioned on one of these threads -- Aristotle's concept of virtue was that a thing did what is was supposed to do. So a virtuous knife cuts, a virtuous stove heats the way it should, a virtuous man thinks about what he is doing, and has a feeling of pride as a result.

Now for where I'm not sure we agree, in fact I'm pretty sure we don't. That's in our evaluations of people we don't really know. You say that you think that these surges of undeserved conceit (and other inner tugs) were part of ARs make-up. So you are evaluating some of her actions as examples of "undeserved" conceit. I want to bring into question the grounds for your evaluation.

Let me look at a couple of examples. One of the things Rand despised the most was someone asking a question in the form of a speech. And I have seen her upbraid the perpetrator of such a thing with a good deal of anger. Her explanation, I always thought, was right on the money. This was her forum, she had earned it, that she had earned it was the reason the person asking the question was there in the first place, and if the questioner wanted to express their views they could do what she did, earn the right to have a platform. She was clearly (at least to me) outraged that anyone -- not just this particular hapless individual -- would not understand how inappropriate such behavior was. And I never saw her fail to calm down and go ahead and answer the question. Is this an example of "undeserved" conceit? Or of anything wrong? Should she not have been angry? Should she not have expressed it with the force she thought was appropriate? Should she have lived her life worried about some Audience Member 'jimminy cricket' sitting on her shoulder?

And I'm not singling out Rand for this "pedestal" position. I mean you, I mean Lindsey, I mean me. Lots of anger happens to not be my style, but it is many people's style. Ever heard of Adele Marcus, the screamer from Juilliard, with whom I had the great privilege to coach a couple of times before her death? She screamed at me. I burst into tears. Turned out she was right. I dealt and I learned. Did Juilliard's reputation as a school of music get damaged because Marcus screamed? Did I reject music because she yelled at me? Hardly.

Yet it is the contention of some that Objectivism was the "laughing stock" of the intelligentsia because she occassionaly "screamed" at a questioner. Or because of her aggressive polemical writing style, or because of her "lack of scholarship." (In all my years of attending live and taped lectures I heard no screaming, but not a few fits of peak at things she obviously thought were more or less self-evident or at least well-known. And again, her anger was short-lived and she always answered the question.) For myself, I think Objectivism was laughed at because she wasn't an established philosopher, but most of all because the people laughing didn't agree with her and found it easier to laugh than argue (which is not to say that her style didn't sometimes make it easier). (This, by the way, is an example of the 3rd rule of compromise, Objectivism is beginning to win because while the laughing largely continues, the difference in basic principles is being clearly defined by the rational side).

I'll discuss the Rand-Brandens thing in another post.

Is a new thread needed for that?

Tom

Post 68

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 4:00pm

Tom, regarding your mentions of various prominent Objectivists in Posts 66 and 67 -- I'd like to keep those personal references out of the "moral perfection" debate. I don't want to confuse the principles we're try to clarify with their possible applications to particular individuals, which would open major, distracting cans of worms..

If you really want to open a (probably acrimonious and futile) discussion of individuals, I do recommend that it be done in another thread. Incidentally, what you said in paragraph 4 of post 66 does not really accurately describe my motives. I have no axes to grind against individuals.

My single motive in addressing the Objectivist movement critically is that I am convinced that exaggerated public claims of virtue made about prominent Objectivists, as well as hollow excuses for episodes of blatant bad behavior, bring public ridicule upon Objectivism. My concern throughout has been for the credibility of the ideas. That credibility isn't enhanced when Objectivists do and say dumb or outrageous things, then try to rationalize them, sometimes even by twisting the meaning and content of Objectivism to allow for their aberrations.

Even if you disagree with my particular assessments of individuals, please understand that the reason for my concern is the future of the philosophy -- a future that bad behavior and excuse-making will jeopardize.

Post 69

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 4:12pm

Tom,

I only make moral judgments about what I know. There is too much that is ambiguous or he said/she said about the Rand/Branden episode for me to make a judgment and frankly I think it is largely immaterial to today's Objectivist movement.

As far as Peikoff, Schwartz, and Binswanger are concerned, they lost all credibility when they kicked the Reismans out of ARI for exercising their fiduciary responsibilities as board members. Peikoff has offered no justification other than it was a personal dispute. This is not hearsay because George Reisman released the actual documents for anyone with two eyes and a brain to evaluate.

What galls me the most about Peikoff is that he makes much of standards of evidence concerning moral judgment, but then expects others to simply ignore what they see and give him the benefit of the doubt. This unbridled hypocrisy is incompatible with a philosophy of reason.

Jim

Post 70

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 5:09pm

Nice post, Jim. The banishment of the Reismans and the accompanying lack of justification by Peikoff and the gang has rankled me for years. I attended a class by George Reisman at the 1993 Objectivist Conference in San Francisco and was impressed by his equanimity, personal charm and insightful mind. I was stunned that he'd been given the heave-ho -- and right before he finished his astounding magnum opus "Capitalism."

I've never seen Reisman be anything other than a great man.

Tom, if I may suggest, you might go back and read either OPAR or Rand's own comments and definitions of the virtues, including pride, which involves both thought and action.

(Edited by David Elmore on 4/22, 5:14pm)

(Edited by David Elmore on 4/22, 5:14pm)

(Edited by David Elmore on 4/22, 5:16pm)

Post 71

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 6:21pm

Robert,

Excuse me if I mischaracterize your position, but what you write in post number 49 seems to conflate something's identify with how it might be measured. I agree, and already said as much in post number 44, that we only have a person's history available to us to judge their character. But judging someone's character is not the same as having direct access to it.

If a person exhibited weak character for ten years, spent ten years gradually improving, and then ten years with exemplary behavior, would a careful observer have to conclude that, still, the evidence is rather weak that he has a good character (20 v. 10 years)? These numbers could be re-worked and made more extreme. Clearly, at some point most anyone would begin to discount the early history in favor of an unbroken more recent (and longer) track record. But if character is entirely just the sum of past actions, then all the years count.

Although I agree – when talking about judgment – we should not make a snap decision (ignore history), I disagree that a person's actual character in the present is inexorably bound by all past actions regardless of the context (how old the actions were, efforts to reform, etc., etc.).

Again, a thing's identity (e.g., a person's character) is not identical to a given set of measurements on that entity (e.g., observable moral choices).

(Edited by Kernon Gibes
on 4/22, 6:26pm)

Post 72

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 6:22pm

Robert,

Re Post 40 - I agree with you that one cannot judge the character of someone else except from knowledge of their actions. But that is NOT what your article was about: it was about judging oneself. With respect to one's own character, the availability of introspective knowledge makes your objection incoherent. To oneself, one's own character is a means, a tool, for excellence at living. Therefore it ought to be, and with introspective knowledge can be, judged on the basis of what it is, and how it is being used, in the present and into the future.

Post 73

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 7:39pm

Kernon, I don't really disagree with your post 71. Perhaps we're tripping up over how we're using words, rather than disagreeing on the substance of our positions.

Adam, regarding post 72, I'd say that judging character is important regarding others. Regarding oneself, character is perceived and experienced as one's reputation with oneself, as a sense of one's moral reliability. Certainly self-awareness requires that you make sure you're staying "on track," morally speaking. But judging or assessing one's own character seems to me a less important matter than simply exercising the virtues day to day in pursuit of one's goals; if one does that, the judgment will take care of itself, in the automatic form of self-esteem.

But in either case, whether judging others or oneself, taking the next step -- trying to gauge "moral perfection" -- still strikes me as a virtually unintelligible mental pursuit, and from a practical standpoint, a meaningless one.

We've all gone around and around on this, and I don't think we're moving beyond positions already stated, and mutually understood. At this point, perhaps we're stuck with just agreeing to disagree.

Post 74

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 10:05pm

James,

I agree with you about the Reismann's to the extent that I know about it.

But lost "all credibility"? And all three of them for Peikoff's actions?

BTW, Reismann's recent article warning against the privatization of Social Security and calling for a principled grandfathering of it, is the subject of an interesting thread at TIA Forum.

Tom

Post 75

Friday, April 22, 2005 - 10:44pm

Robert,

No axes to grind against individuals? Then why would our private discussion of them be acrimonious?

Since I don't see how we continue to discuss "moral perfection" without discussing the individuals which were the target of your original post, namely all the "prominent Objectivists" who were included in your sweeping indictment that "nobody's perfect," who would you suggest we discuss?

And while saying that you don't want to talk about them, in the very next paragraph you talk about them with the same sweeping accusations.

Robert, everyone knows who we are talking about, and I assume that everyone who's interested in this thread (very few, it looks like) knows the context of discussion about "moral perfection" is those people.

But, in the end, I think you're right. You seem to be very angry about something, and I'm not interested in your anger or in making you more angry.

Robert, I don't think you can be concerned about the future of Objectivism without judging the people involved, and it's pretty clear that you agree with me, as you say in the third paragraph of #68. But are you more concerned with public opinion of Objectivism or of Objectivists. And why be concerned with public opinion at all?

In any case, when you make the kind of accusations you make in that paragraph, once again, you are continuing to grind axes against individuals.

So you need to know that I do not agree with your judgment, for reasons which need not concern you or make you angry any more.

I leave the field.

Tom

Post 76

Saturday, April 23, 2005 - 8:01am

Rowland wrote:

That man is fallible is clear. But while that fact is causally relevant to “errors of knowledge” I don’t see how it says enough, if anything, about “errors of morality.”

Tom here is your problem in a nutshell. Knowledge is the foundation upon which morality is built, if errors of knowledge are possible, it follows that moral decisions based upon knowledge that is in error, makes for errors of morality.

There is no way to escape the fact that because man can err, he can also be immoral (even if unintentionally) when his perception of his action is based upon an error or knowledge.

Post 77

Saturday, April 23, 2005 - 9:31am

"Unintentional immorality" is a contradiction in terms.

Post 78

Saturday, April 23, 2005 - 9:55am

Robert - re Post 73:

I liked and mostly agreed with your original article, except for a quibble about one word. I was surprised by the length and intensity of your response. I was also surprised by your disagreement with the principle behind my quibble: that one benefits from keeping one's virtues (and their sum, one's character) in the best working order one can. I find this a realistic and useful concept of moral self-perfection. As near as I figure, your experience taught you that big power tools like "moral perfection" can be dangerous. When it comes to self-mastery, you prefer safety over power; I prefer power over safety. But then, I prefer Unix over Windows. And, now that we have agreed to disagree, I am grateful to you for a discussion that refined my understanding why.

Post 79

Saturday, April 23, 2005 - 12:25pm